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I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Harrises are correct; this case should not be here. Appellants' Brief at 20. This 
dispute was contractual both in its inception-the 1949 land sale certificate and the 1971 deed- 
and in its resolution during the 1986-1999 period-the two mineral leases. Although the 
Harrises would like to bootstrap the record, decision, and Plaintiffs' counsel's prior briefing from 
Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 (1999), into the matter at 
hand, the simple fact is the holding in Treasure Valley Concrete only addressed the interpretation 
of mineral reservations made pursuant to Idaho Code 5 47-701. Any other conjoining of the two 
cases by the Harrises is simply an attempt to cloud the issues in the case at hand. Furthermore, 
their historical account of the State's claim of ownership of the sand and gravel merely provides 
a framework to explain why the Harrises and the State attempted to resolve their dispute with the 
mineral lease that is the central issue in this appeal. 
The existence of the land sale certificate, deed and mineral lease distinguish the present 
controversy from Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987), 
the principal basis for the Harrises' contention that a takings existed. Even were IDL's conduct 
between September 1985 and March 1986 properly analogized to the federal government's 
actions in Yuba, the district court ultimately ruled the Yuba rationale thus supports, at the very 
most, a taking only as to the amount paid by the Hmises to the State for sand and gravel 
removed from the property before the lease was signed on April 1, 1986 (R. Vol. VI, pp. 1109- 
10). That amount is $5405.22. But even there, the Harrises face an insuperable barrier: the 
statute of limitations in Idaho Code 5 5-224 which precludes any recovery on their takings claim 
(R. Vol. VI, pp. 1 1 10-12). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Harrises' 40-acre parcel is part of 120 acres of public school lands sold in 1949 to 
Frank A. Wilken. First Aff. Steven J. Schuster (R. Vol. I, pp. 95-1 12). The land sale certificate 
reserved to the State "the right to all coal, oil, oil shale, gas, phosphate, sodium and other mineral 
deposits . . . , as required by Chapter 96 of the 1926 Session Laws." Wilken assigned his interest 
to William A. Riley in 1950, and the State issued a deed to Riley's estate in 1971. Id. (R. Vol. I, 
p. 101). The deed was subject "to the provisions of $47-701, Idaho Code, reserving to the State 
dl Mineral Rights in lands subsequent to the 8th day of May, 1923 including sand and gravel." 
The phrase "including sand and gravel" was added by typed interlineation to the deed form. The 
Harrises acquired their parcel in 1980. Am. Comp. 5 (R. Vol. I, p. 36). 
The Harrises conduct fanning operations on the parcel but also have sold sand and gravel 
excavated there. Am. Comp. 10 (R. Vol. I, p. 37). The Idaho Department of Lands ("IDL") 
became aware of the latter activity in early 1985. Aff. Sharon Murray (R. Vol. 111, pp. 586-601). 
An IDL supervisory forester, Nolan Noreen, wrote Plaintiff Douglas Harris on September 9, 
1985, advising him that "[wlhen the State sold this property [in 19491, all mineral rights were 
reserved including sand and gravel." Id (R. Vol. 111, p. 592). The letter added that he had "been 
advised by our Minerals Department that the rock removed from this property qualifies as a 
reserve right and royalties for this material must be paid to the State" and requested Harris to 
"submit to this office any records that may verify the amount of rock removed so this situation 
may be resolved." Id. 
The Harrises contacted an attorney who, in turn, met with an IDL employee in Boise, 
Idaho during the later part of September 1985. First Aff. Sharon K. Harris (R. Vol. IV, pp. 747- 
55). A letter from the attorney to Plaintiff Sharon Harris stated that various matters were 
discussed and opined in part that "if the [I9491 deed . . . is valid[,] 'the rock pit' would be within 
land subject to the claim of the State." Id. (R. Vol. N, p. 754). The attorney recounted the IDL 
employee, Linda Johnson, as saying that she had "many cases where the Courts have heard that 
sand and gravel apply to basalt, granite or other kinds of rock that would be removed where the 
State has reserved the rights to sand and gravel" and that "if this defense"-i.e., the mineral 
reservation did not extend to sand and gravel-"it would be unsuccessful." Id. Johnson 
recommended that the Harrises enter into a lease that would allow for sand and gravel excavation 
and thereby avoid the potential for higher royalty fees associated with negligent or willful 
trespass. Id. The attorney believed that the State would not back away from its position because 
"Johnson says that it is her duty and the duties of her department to collect this money for the 
Endowment Fund." Id (R. Vol. IV, p. 755). The attorney enclosed leasing documents tendered 
during the meeting. Mrs. Harris concluded that "[wle were given no other option but to sign the 
Mineral Leases or be sued in trespass." Id. (R. Vol. N, p. 749) (emphasis added). 
In February 1986, Johnson wrote Mr. Harris advising him again of the State's position 
concerning the need for a mineral lease to avoid potential trespass. Aff. Sharon Murray (R. Vol. 
111, p. 593). She informed Harris that the South Latah Highway District reported having 
purchased approximately 50,000 tons of sand and gravel from the parcel. Id The letter 
requested payment of $5000--or ten cents per ton-as a royalty for the past excavation and 
explained that the Highway District had been told that no further sand and gravel removal would 
be permitted in the absence of a lease. Id Johnson advised Harris that the alternatives were 
either to sign a mineral lease or for the Highway District to lease directly with the State and that, 
"as the surface owner, [you] would have an agreement based on the loss of your surface estate." 
Id. (R. Vol. 111, p. 594). The letter concluded by explaining that the annual $160 rental fee under 
the proposed lease served as a minimum prepaid royalty. Id. 
The Harrises resolved the dispute by entering into a standard ten-year mineral lease 
effective April 1, 1986. First Aff. Steven J. Schuster (R. Vol. I, pp. 102-06). It contained 
various provisions germane to leasing activities, including a disclaimer in section 27 with respect 
to representations or warranties of ownership. The royalty rate was set at 24 cents per ton. Id. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 105)'. The parties executed another ten-year lease at the first lease's conclusion 
with comparable terms. Id. (R. Vol. I, pp. 107-12). The State, however, terminated the lease in 
November 1999 and relinquished any ownership interest in the sand-and-gravel mineral interest 
in light of the then-recent decision in Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673,978 
P.2d 233 (1999)'. Aff. Sharon Murray, (R. Vol. 111, pp. 600-601). It further tendered with the 
letter a proposed settlement check in the amount $17,076.88-which represented all royalty 
payments during the prior five years-to resolve any claims, but Plaintiffs declined the offer. Id 
111. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Harrises filed suit in 2002 on three claims; quiet title, mesne profits and inverse 
condemnation. The State then counterclaimed to quiet title. In October 2003 the court granted 
summary judgment for the Harrises on their quiet title claim and reformed the deed, striking the 
words "including sand and gravel." (R. Vol. IV, p. 742.) The Harrises' Motion for Summary 
' The 1986 mineral lease also contained "additional stipulations" concerning preparation of an operating 
and reclamation plan, increased bond requirements when motorized earth-moving equipment was used, 
and waiver of the standard $5000 bond requirement. Id at Ex. " B  (R. Vol. I, p. 106). 
2 Treasure Valley Concrete held that, prior to 1986 amendments, Idaho Code 5 47-701's reservation of 
mineral interests did not extend to sand, gravel and pumice. 132 Idaho at 675-77, 978 P.2d at 235-37. 
None of the conveyance documents at issue in that case contained an express reservation of sand and 
gravel interests. The State Board of Land Commissioners nevertheless adopted in Treasure Valley 
Concrete's wake a policy extending the decision to all pre-1986 transfers where sand and gravel interests 
were not resewed expressly in the land sale certificate and the associated deed. Apr. 30, 2004 Aff. Mary 
K. Denton, Ex. A at 2 (R. Vol. N, p. 632). 
Judgment seeking damages on the quiet title claim was denied on the basis that the Harrises 
authorized the State's actions under section 27 of the lease agreement and that the Harrises had 
consented to the State's possession or occupation. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 740, 741.) In August 2006, 
the court ruled upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to the inverse 
condemnation claim, granting the Hanises' motion. (R. Vol. V, pp. 979, 980.) The State then 
filed motions seeking reconsideration and clarification which the court ruled on in July 2007. 
(R. Vol. VI, pp. 1106-13.) 
In its decision, the court reiterated that section 27 of the lease precludes any recovery by 
the Hanises for the period of lease and ruled that Idaho Code 8 5-224 precludes recovery by the 
Harrises on their inverse condemnation claim. Id. The Harrises then moved for attorney fees 
under Idaho Code 9 12-121 with respect to their quiet title claim. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of 
Costs and Fees dated August 8,2007. The court denied the attorney fee request. 
IV. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Where the Hanises contracted with the State by way of the mineral lease, can 
there be a "takings claim" as a matter of law? Phrased alternatively, since the Hanises entered 
into a lease that authorized the "taking," can any inverse condemnation claim exist? 
2. Where the mineral lease was not the product of duress, was supported by 
consideration, was possible of performance, was not the product of mistake of law or fact, and 
was not unconscionable, was the lease binding on the parties? 
3. Does the statute of limitations, Idaho Code 5 5-224, bar the Harrises' claims? 
4. Can a damage claim be brought when the State's occupation/possession was not 
wrongful, but rather was consented to by the Harrises? 
5.  Did the lower court correctly rule that the Harrises were not entitled to attorney 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-121? 
v. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs do not contest the standards of review set forth by the Harrises at pages 19-20 
of their brief. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Parties' Dispute Centered on the Proper Interpretation of the 1949 Land Sale 
Certificate and 1971 Deed, and It Was Resolved Through the Mineral Lease. 
Takings Relief Is Thus Unavailable but, Even Under a Yuba-Based Rationale, 
Should Be Limited to Royalties Paid for Sand and Gravel Sold Prior to Entry Into 
the Lease 
No factual dispute exists over the genesis of the controversy here: The scope of the 
mineral reservation in the 1949 land sale certificate and the related deed. The initial 
correspondence from IDL to Plaintiffs consequently referred to the reservation contained in the 
certificate, and the subsequent meeting between their attorney and Linda Johnson focused on the 
reservation's reach. His advice concerning settlement, in turn, reflected an assessment of the 
likelihood of prevailing on that issue. The parties resolved their contractual dispute initially 
through entry into another contract, the mineral lease, with the controversy's ultimate resolution 
predicated on this Court's construction of the statute, Idaho Code 5 47-701, whose requirements 
were incorporated by reference into the sale certificate and deed. The parties' relationship, in 
sum, arose from and was governed throughout by their contractual undertakings. 
1. The Hmises Abandoned Anv Takings Claim bv Virtue of Their Entrv into the 
1986 Lease 
Any damage claim arising from the economic relationship here implicates breach-of- 
contract, not Fourteenth Amendment-grounded takings and just compensation, principles. 
Shawnee Sewage & Drainage Co. v. Stearns, 220 U.S. 462, 471 (1911) ("[tlhe breach of a 
contract is neither a confiscation of property nor a taking of property without due process of 
law"). As the Federal Circuit stated in Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 
271 F.3d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2001): 
This court's predecessor has cautioned against commingling takings 
compensation and contract damages. Indeed, "the concept of a taking as a 
compensable claim theory has limited application to the relative rights of party 
litigants when those rights have been voluntarily created by contract. In such 
instances, interference with such contractual rights generally gives rise to a 
breach claim not a taking claim." . . . Taking claims rarely arise under 
government contracts because the Government acts in its commercial or 
proprietary capacity in entering contracts, rather than in its sovereign 
capacity. . . . Accordingly, remedies arise from the contracts themselves, rather 
than from the constitutional protection of private property rights. 
Id. at 1070 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. UnitedStates 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. C1. 1978)); see also Die 
Casters Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 73 Fed. C1. 174, 197 (2006) ("when the Government acts as a 
contractual partner in a commercial venture, the rights and responsibilities of the parties must be 
analyzed with reference to the contract"); La Gloria Oil and Gas Co. v. United States, 72 Fed. 
C1. 544, 577 (2006) ("[wlhere a contract between the plaintiff and the government covers the 
property that the plaintiff asserts has been 'taken,' the court must look to the contract to determine 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages"). 
The impropriety of a takings claim in this context derives from a straightforward source: 
Even when a contract violation has occurred, the breached obligation remains judicially 
enforceable at the discretion of the aggrieved party. E.g., Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("the government did not take the plaintiffs' property because they retained 
the range of remedies associated with the vindication of a contract") (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Rain & Hail Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 229 F .  Supp. 2d 710, 713 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002) ("[a] takings claim is inappropriate where it duplicates a breach of contract claim and 
a breach of contract remedy is available to the plaintiff"). The key consideration, in other words, 
is whether a "symmetry [exists] between the contract rights to be enforced and the contract 
damages that are available." Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. C1. 504, 532, n.46 
(2005). That symmetry will be found where "the takings claim is identical to the subject of the 
contract[s] at issue." Am. Growers Ins. Co. v. Fed. Crop. Ins. Corp., 210 F .  Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 
(S.D. Iowa 2002); see also B & B Trucking, Inc. v. USPS, 406 F.3d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting takings claims since the plaintiffs' "objection to the contract amendments is the 
essence of their  claim^")^. 
This settled authority runs directly counter to the Harrises' contention that the State 
effected a taking of the parcel's sand and gravel interest. The Harrises were never dispossessed 
A useful analog to the relationship between contracts and takings are claims under impairment of contract clause. 
U.S. Const. art. I, 5 10, cl. 1. In Homitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248 (7th Cir. 199G), a 
developer contended that Chicago had repudiated a contract in violation of the Contracts Clause. Then-Chief Judge 
Posner began the court's analysis on behalf of a unanimous panel by observing: 
[Wlhen a state repudiates a contract to which it is a party it is doing nothing different from what a 
private party does when the party repudiates a contract; it is committing a breach of contract. It 
would be absurd to turn every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a violation of the 
federal Constitution. 
Id. at 1250. The court continued on to identify as tbe "essence" of the difference between a cognizable contract- 
impairment claim and a breach of contract action the fact that, in the latter, the breach "triggers a duty to pay 
damages for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the breach" and that "[ilf th[is] duty is unimpaired, the 
obligation of the contract cannot be said to have been impaired." Id. at 1251. It found no impermissible impairment 
in light of the fact that the city council's action had not deprived the developer of its contract-based remedies. Id. 
Justice Scalia's concurrence in United States v. Wimtar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996), is cited oRen for the same 
proposition. Id. at 919 ("[~Jirtually every contract operates, not as a guarantee of particular future conduct, but as an 
assumption of liability in the event of nonperformance: 'The duty to keep a contract at common law means a 
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,--and nothing else"'). 
of the right to seek enforcement of the contract reflected in the land sale certificate or 
reformation of deed to reflect the correct interpretation of the former's incorporation of Idaho 
Code $47-701's requirement regarding mineral reservations. Indeed, the parties resolved their 
contract dispute without the need for judicial intervention through entry into the mineral lease 
and the $5000 royalty payment for past sand and gravel sales. The Harrises thereby chose to 
forego a breach of contract claim with respect to the State's assertion of sand and gravel 
ownership as amounts excavated before the mineral lease became effective and during the term 
of the lease i t s e~ f .~  
The decision in Boyce v. Augusta-Richmond County, 11 1 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Ga. 
2000), is particularly instructive given these circumstances. There, dairy farmers contended that 
sludge from a municipal wastewater treatment facility injured their cattle and alleged what the 
district court characterized as a "Fifth Amendment just compensation" or inverse condemnation 
claim for a physical taking. Id. at 1379. The plaintiffs and the county defendant, however, had 
entered into agreements authorizing the sludge's application to the farm's land. The court 
recognized that the takings cause of action was "in substance" a breach of contract claim but 
that, even if the agreements were not valid, they nevertheless indicated that "the Plaintiffs 
consented to certain sludge applications." Id. at 1382-83. It then pointed to precedent holding 
"that a property owner cannot bring an inverse condemnation claim when the owner permits the 
government to use the property pursuant to an agreement." Id. at 1383 (citing Janowsb v. 
United States, 23 C1. Ct. 706 (1991), rev'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 989 
F.2d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The court followed this "'bright line' between voluntary dealings 
involving property owners and the government and constitutional takings of property" (id.) and 
4 It hears mention that nothing precluded the Harrises .From terminating the mineral lease and pursuing a contract 
remedy with respect to future sand and gravel sales. Section 17 allowed them to surrender the lease at any time. 
reiterated that "Plaintiffs' rights concerning these parcels of land emanate from the agreements, 
not the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause" (id. at 1384). Boyce serves to underscore 
the result dictated by the general rule--contractual disputes are not appropriate candidates for 
taking claims where breach remedies remain-and further suggests, as developed below, that 
such claims are precluded when access to, or possession of, the very property right at issue has 
been granted. This Court's analysis can, and should, stop with recognition of the general rule, 
thereby foreclosing any takings claim. 
2. The Harrises Lacked Any Protected Prooertv Interest in the Sand and Gravel 
Given the Lease Provisions 
The district court originally relied upon Yuba for its takings determination in the August 
2, 2006, Memorandum Opinion, which was eventually withdrawn in the July 25, 2007, 
Memorandum Opinion (R. Vol. VI, p. 1112). The Harrises continue to assert the State made 
various threats against the Harrises in order to get them to sign the mineral lease. Appellants' 
Brief at 4, 34, 36. The documents relevant to the communications between the parties 
nevertheless reflect only that IDL representatives indicated their willingness to institute trespass 
proceedings against the Harrises if they extracted and sold sand and gravel and that IDL advised 
the South Latah Highway District not to purchase those items from the Harrises because of the 
ownership dispute. There is no case law support for the notion that a "threat" to institute a 
judicial proceeding constitutes a taking. No less tenable is the suggestion that advising a state 
political subdivision not to remove sand and gravel from the property in the absence of a lease 
somehow constituted a taking. See Idaho Code 5 40-601 (county highway district "recognized as 
a legal taxing district and body politic of this state"). The present case additionally differs from 
Yuba because IDL did not prevent the Harrises from gaining access to their property generally or 
using it for purposes other than sand and gravel excavation; the department's actions instead were 
were tailored to resolution of the precise dispute at hand. 
Even more importantly, however, this matter differs from Yuba because the Harrises 
entered into the mineral lease explicitly authorizing the alleged "taking." The lease's validity 
was established in the July 20,2004, Order denying the Harrises' request for restitution damages 
and mesne profits; i.e., a necessary antecedent condition to giving effect to section 27 was the 
validity of the contract containing it. The district court thus held (1) "it is [not] unjust or 
inequitable for the defendants to retain the plaintiffs' rent and royalty payments" in light of the 
lease (Jul. 20,2004, Order (R. Vol. rV, p. 736)); (2) adequate consideration underlay the lease by 
virtue of the State's "refraining from exercising the right to resort to the courts to settle [the] 
dispute" (id.); (3) "[tlhe fact that plaintiffs executed the leases indicates both parties believed the 
defendants had a legitimate claim to the sand and gravel under the deed" (id. (R. Vol. IV, p. 
737)); (4) the leases were not vitiated by a mistake of law in the absence of any "evidence of 
fraud, undue influence, or other inequitable conduct" (id (R. Vol. IV, p. 739)); (5 )  the leases 
were not vitiated by a mistake of fact since "plaintiffs assumed responsibility [under section 271 
for satisfLing themselves regarding ownership of land and agreed to waive any claim for refund 
of the rents and royalties paid to defendants in the event defendants did not actually have title to 
the sand and gravel" (id. (R. Vol. IV, p. 740)); and (6) since "the plaintiffs entered into an 
agreement with the State in which they specifically acknowledged the nature of the State's title[,] 
. . . they cannot establish that the State wrongfully dispossessed them of the sand and gravel" as a 
predicate for an award of mesne profits (id. (R. Vol. IV, p. 741)). 
Given the lease's validity, the Harrises lacked any legally protected interest in the sand- 
and-gravel mineral estate prerequisite to a takings claim. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984) (identifying issues presented by takings claim, and specifying 
the existence of a protected property interest as the threshold question); Moon v. N. Idaho 
Farmers Assfn, 140 Idaho 536, 544, 96 P.3d 637, 645 (2004) (declining to find a protected 
property interest in the form of the constructive easement based on the right to maintain a 
nuisance action); Die Casters, 73 Fed. C1. at 198 (no legally cognizable property interest in 
equipment where "the Government held title to the equipment and had the right to determine 
when title vested in the joint venture, but the joint venture was never formed"); c$ Harkness v. 
City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 355-56, 715 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (1986) (property interest 
necessary for procedural due process protection). As the Court of Federal Claims has succinctly 
observed, "the government cannot take what the claimant does not have." K h a t h ,  67 Fed. C1. 
at 532, n.46. Consequently, the district court, withdrew the August 2006 Memorandum Opinion 
and did not find a takings for the period subject to the two mineral leases-i.e., April 1, 1986, to 
November 22, 1999-any takings determination was limited to the pre-lease period and thus 
recovery was barred by the four-year statute of limitations contained in Idaho Code § 5-224. (R. 
Vol. VI, pp. 1109-12.) 
B. The Mineral Lease Is a Valid Binding Contract 
The Harrises realize that the existence of the mineral lease defeats their takings claim. 
They now seek to have the lease invalidated or rescinded on a litany of grounds, some of which 
do not appear to have been raised below. Oddly, the Harrises also rely on some portions of the 
lease in order to establish the extent of the "taking." Specifically, the Harrises seek to inflate 
their claims for "damages" by citing to "interference" with their surface estate and transforming 
a potential recovery of approximately $5,000 into over $400,000. (R. Vol. V1, pp. 1064-69, 
1040-41 .) No other evidence of actual "interference" by the State exists. 
1. The Mineral Lease Was Supported by Consideration 
The district court found adequate consideration underlay the lease by virtue of the State's 
"refraining from exercising the right to resort to the courts to settle [the] dispute" (Jul. 20, 2004, 
Order (R. Vol. IV, pp. 736-1037)). See also McMahon v. Auger, 83 Idaho 27, 38, 357 P.2d 374, 
380 (1960) (forbearance in asserting a claim or right is sufficient consideration for a promise as 
long as the claim is not utterly groundless); McColm-Traska v. Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 
502, 65 P.3d 519, 524 (2003) (refraining from exercising the right to resort to litigation is 
adequate consideration to settle a dispute); E. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Placerton, Inc., 606 
P.2d 967, 100 Idaho 863 (1980) (agreed-to forbearance from suing on a matured contract right is 
sufficieni consideration to support a promise). 
The Harrises' assertion that they now somehow "got nothing" due to the state's counter 
claim for quiet title is incongruous. Apparently the Harrises would simply have had the State 
declare "you win" in response to their own lawsuit and claim for title. The existence of a 
debatable question of law is evident from the district court's reversal of its original ruling on the 
quiet title issue and its refusal to grant Harrises' request for attorney's fees on that claim. (R. 
Vol. 11, pp. 316-17,741-42.) In this instance the district court ruled in the Harrises' favor and the 
State has chosen not to appeal the quiet title issue. However, it is precisely the risk of 
uncertainty in litigation which prompted the parties to enter into the mineral lease and to include 
Section 27. 
Furthermore, directly militating against any contention that IDL's position concerning the 
effect and meaning of 5 47-701 was baseless, is Treasure Valley Concrete itself. The Supreme 
Court denied the landowner's request for attorney's fees under Idaho Code $ 12-1 17 because IDL 
"acted with a reasonable basis in fact or law." 132 Idaho at 677, 978 P.2d at 237. It reasoned 
that "[tlhe interpretation of Idaho Code 47-701 and whether sand, gravel and pumice are 
included in that section's [pre-19861 list of minerals presents a question of first impression before 
the Court" and that "other states have interpreted 'minerals' in similar statutes to include, sand, 
gravel and pumice." Id. Absent from Treasure Valley Concrete, moreover, was an express 
reservation in a deed of sand and gravel interests--contrary to the situation here. The Harrises 
received adequate consideration for the lease; they refused a refund and seek instead a windfall. 
2. The Doctrine of Impossibility is Inapplicable 
The cases cited by the Harrises in their brief to support their claim of impossibility fail to 
address the standard utilized by this Court when determining impossibility of performance. 
Rather, the Harrises have attempted to reframe Mecham v. Nelson, 92 Idaho 783, 451 P.2d 529 
(1969), a case concerning failure of conditions precedent to performance. Appellants' Brief at 
27-29. The proper standard for the doctrine of impossibility was addressed in Kessler v. Tortoise 
Development Inc., 130 Idaho 105, 108, 937 P.2d 417, 420 (1997), "In order to prove 
impossibility: (1) a contingency must occur; (2) performance must be impossible, not just more 
difficult or more expensive; and (3) the nonoccurrence of the contingency must be a basic 
assumption of the agreement."' 
The occurrence of the "contingency" or "condition precedent" the Harrises claim made 
the agreement "impossible," i.e., the district court's holding that the State did not have title to the 
sand and gravel underlying the Harrises' property, was specifically addressed in Section 27 of 
the leases: 
Respondent is unable to find where the Harrises raised the doctrine of impossibility in the proceedings 
before the district court nor do the Harrises provide any citation to the record where such an argument 
was raised. It is well established that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by 
the Supreme Court. See Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 160 P.3d 743 (2007). 
Additionally, parties will be held to not only the issues presented to the trial court, hut also the theories 
upon which those issues were presented. Masters v. State, 105 ldaho 197, 668 P.2d 73 (1983). 
TITLE. Lessor makes no representation or warranty whatsoever with 
respect to its title to said leased premises and Lessee shall be solely responsible 
for satisfying itself with respect to ownership of such lands; and if subsequently 
divested of said title, no liability shall be incurred by virtue of the lease for any 
loss or damage to the Lessee; nor shall any claim for refund of rents or royalties 
therefore paid, he made by said Lessee, its successors or assignees. 
First Affidavit of Steven Schuster, Exhibits D and E. @. Vol. I, pp. 102-12.) The plain meaning 
of the lease should not be disturbed where the intent of the parties at the time of execution is 
clearly expressed in the language of the agreement. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Rycair, Inc., 138 Idaho 
557, 564, 67 P.3d 36, 43 (2003). Moreover, were the Harrises' arguments accepted, litigants 
would be disinclined to enter into releases to settle potential lawsuits for fear that one party could 
simply proceed with litigation and recover damages despite the terms of the release. The lease is 
straightforward. The Harrises chose to sign it and either did consult or could have consulted an 
attorney. They should not now he able to request it be declared impossible to perform simply to 
advance an untenable takings claim and avoid the four-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code 
$ 5-224. 
3. Mutualitv of Intent 
The plain meaning of the lease should not be disturbed where the intent of the parties at 
the time of execution is clearly expressed in the language of the agreement. J.R. Simplot, 138 
Idaho at 564, 67 P.3d at 43. The Harrises have not alleged that Section 27 of the lease was 
ambiguous and in fact recognize "that a party may contract to absolve himself from certain 
duties and liabilities subject to certain limitations." Appellants' Brief at 32, citing Rawlings v. 
Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107, 110 (1970). Any analysis of the 
parties' intent should end with this general principle. 
The Harrises' contention that "as of 1986, the law had changed and the State itself was 
no longer claiming title in these situations and therefore Linda Lou Johnson was not acting under 
a colorable claim of title" is simply wrong. Appellants' Brief at 32. First "the law" did not 
"change" until the ruling in Treasure Valley Concrete, Znc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 
(1999), clarified the interpretation of "mineral" in Idaho Code § 47-701. This was 13 years after 
the Hanises signed the mineral lease and after the ruling they were offered a refbnd, which they 
declined. Second, unlike the plaintiffs in Treasure Valley Concrete, the Harrises had a deed 
which specifically reserved sand and gravel to the State and thus, in actuality, the "law" did not 
change until the district court's July 20, 2004, Order reformed the deed. (R. Vol. IV, p. 742.) 
The State and the Harrises had a dispute over title, they chose to resolve it by entering into the 
mineral lease, the plain language of Section 27 permitted either party to go to court to resolve the 
issue; however, the Harrises waived any right they might have to seek reimbursement in the 
event title was quieted in their name. 
4. The Mineral Lease Was Not the Product of Duress 
Plaintiffs rely on Swift C. & B. Co. v. United States, 11 1 U.S. 22,4 S. Ct. 244, 28 L. Ed. 
341 (1884), a case concerning the interpretation of an arcane federal taxation act on proprietary 
stamps that has nothing to do with duress, rather than discuss the standard utilized by this Court. 
The Swift decision simply resulted in a recalculation of the taxes paid and was not governed by 
any contractual agreement between the IRS and the plaintiff. Furthermore, the Court limited the 
amount of time for which the plaintiff could recover because "[tlhere was nothing in the nature 
of the business, nor the mode in which it was conducted, nor in the accounts required, that 
prevented a suit from he.ing brought, for the amount of commissions withheld, in each instance 
as it occurred and was ascertained." 11 1 U.S. at 3 1. 
In Idaho, "[tlo be voidable because of duress, an agreement must not only be obtained by 
means of pressure brought to bear, but the agreement itself must be unjust, unconscionable, or 
illegal. The essence of duress is the sunender to unlawful or unconscionable demands. It can 
not be predicated upon demands which are lawful, or the threat to do that which the demanding 
party has legal rights to do." Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 541, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953). 
Furthermore, lawsuits and threats to sue do not give rise to a claim for duress. See Stoddard v. 
Stoddard, 641 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1981). 
This Court has created a three-part test to determine whether the execution of a contract 
was the product of duress in Lomas and Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enterprises, 99 Idaho 539, 585 
(1) one side involuntarily accepted the terms of the other; (2) that 
circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances 
were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party. 
99 Idaho at 542, 585 P.2d at 952. The district court ruled on prong one of the Lomas test in 
finding that there was adequate consideration for entering into the mineral lease. See July 20, 
2004, Order (R. Vol. IV, pp. 736-37). Additionally, the Court in Lomas went on to explain 
economic duress by quoting from Inland Empire Refineries, Inc. v. Jones, 69 Idaho 335, '206 
P.2d 5 19 (1 949): 
Business compulsion is not established merely by proof that consent is 
secured by pressure of financial circumstances; or that one party insisted upon a 
legal right and the other party yielded to such insistence. Neither will a mere 
threat to withhold from a party a legal right which he has an adequate remedy to 
enforce, constitute duress. Generally, the demand by one party must be wrongful 
or unlawhl, and the other party must have no other means of immediate relief 
from the actual or threatened duress than by compliance with the demand. 
99 Idaho at 543, 585 P.2d at 953.(emphasis added). Here, the Harrises had available to them in 
1985 and 1986 exactly the same remedy that they invoked two decades later-a quiet title 
proceeding-to resist the State's claim of sand-and-gravel ownership, 
The Court in Treasure Valley Concrete stated that the issue of "the interpretation of 
Idaho Code 5 47-701 and whether sand, gravel, and pumice are included in that section's list of 
minerals presents a question of first impression before the Court." 132 Idaho at 678,978 P.2d at 
238. Since Treasure Valley Concrete was not decided until April 1999, at the time the State 
asserted its claim of ownership over the sand and gravel on the Hanises' land (1985), the claim 
was not "wrongful or unlawful." Lomas, 99 Idaho at 543, 585 P.2d at 953. Furthermore, the 
deed for the subject property specifically reserved title to the sand and gravel for the State. 
The Harrises, again, were free to file suit at the first indication that the State was 
attempting to assert ownership of the sand and gravel on the Hanises' land. The Harrises 
consulted an attorney to determine if they were truly liable for the proposed charges and then 
"yielded" to the State's claim of ownership. First Amended Complaint, Exhibit G, p. 2 (March 
14, 2000, letter from the Harrises to the State) (R. Vol. I, p. 62). Thus the "circumstances" did 
permit another "alternative," the Hanises could have filed suit just like the plaintiff did in 
Treasure Valley Concrete. Therefore, the Harrises have failed to satisfy prong two (2) of Lomas. 
Finally, the district court ruled on the final prong on the issue of coercion, stating: 
Here, the court finds no evidence of fraud, undue influence, or other 
inequitable conduct on the part of the defendants requiring deviation from the 
general rule prohibiting restitution of payments made based upon a mistake of 
fact or law. Instead, it appears that both parties believed the defendants owned 
the rights to the sand and gravel on the property when they entered into the 
mineral lease. 
July 20,2004, Order at 10 (R. Vol. IV, p. 739). 
The district court ruled that the terms of lease were voluntarily mutually agreed upon. 
The only "evidence" to the contrary is the Hanises' characterization of the negotiations leading 
up to the execution of the lease as "threats" of the State initiating legal proceedings. Those legal 
proceeding would have been of the same type (quiet title and for restitution) that the Harrises 
eventually initiated against the State. The district court's many reversals and the refusal to award 
attorney's fees in the Treasure Valley Concrete case are prima facie evidence that the State's 
position was not baseless or the product of deceit. Finally, it would be highly inequitable to 
characterize the State's indication of its willingness to initiate its own quiet title action as 
"duress" and then permit the Harrises to not only renege on the agreement, but then actually 
commence the very same proceedings against the State. 
5. The Harrises Contractuallv Agreed to Assume the Risk of Mistake of Law and 
Fact 
The district court found that the Harrises had contractually agreed to assume the risk of 
investigating the State's title to the subject sand and gravel via Section 27 of the mineral lease. 
(R. Vol. IV, pp. 738-40.) The district court raised the issue of mistake of law sua sponte and 
relied on Breckenridge v. Johnston, 62 Idaho 121, 133, 108 P.2d 833,838 (1940), in finding that 
the Harrises assumed the burden of investigating the State's claim to title. "Generally, absent 
fraud, undue influence, or other inequitable conduct by the party against whom relief is sought, a 
court will not grant restitution of money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts 
based upon mistake of law as to the obligation to make such payment." (R. Vol. IV, p. 738.) No 
fraud, undue influence, or other inequitable conduct was found, and the language of Section 27 
specifically and clearly allocated the risk of investigating the State's title to the Harrises. (R. Vol. 
IV, p. 739.) 
Likewise, the district court raised the issue of mistake of fact sua sponte and denied the 
Harrises relief. Id. In so holding, the court relied on the Restatement Second of Contracts 5 154 
as quoted in Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 637,640, 671 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1983): 
A party bears the risk of mistake when "he is aware, at the time the contract 
is made, that he has limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the 
mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient." The aggrieved 
party in such an instance is a victim of his own conscious ignorance rather than a 
mistake of fact. A party also bears the risk of a mistake when the parties' 
agreement specifically allocates that risk to him. 
July 20, 2004, Order at 10-1 1 (R. Vol. IV, p. 739-740). The mineral lease not only specifically 
allocated the title risk to the Ilarrises, but the issue of title also was the precise reason the parties 
entered negotiations which were ultimately resolved with the mineral lease. The Hmises cannot 
now assert that they were unaware that there was a dispute over the title to the sand and gravel 
and ignore the express terms of the lease and the months of negotiations which took place 
leading up to its execution. There simply was no "mistake of fact" that was not specifically 
addressed in the lease. The Harrises chose to bear this risk and treat their "limited knowledge as 
sufficient." 
6. The Mineral Lease Was Not Unconscionable 
Respondent is once again unable to find if or where the Harrises raised this argument 
before the district court. The Hmises additionally provide no citation to the record where they 
raised the contention. It is well established that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will 
not be considered by the Supreme Court. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church, 144 Idaho at 310, 
160 P.3d at 749. 
Several principles control disposition of the Harrises' unconscionability claim. "Courts 
do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable." 
Lovey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41, 72 P.3d 877, 881 (2003). "It is not 
sufficient, however, that the contractual provisions appear unwise or their enforcement may 
seem harsh." 139 Idaho at 38, 72 P.3 at 882. "[Flor a contract or contractual provision to be 
voided as unconscionable, it must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable." Id. 
Application of these principles leaves no doubt about the correct result here. 
First, 
Indicators of procedural unconscionability generally fall into two areas: 
lack of voluntariness and lack of knowledge. Lack of voluntariness can be 
shown by factors such as the use of high pressure tactics, coercion, oppression or 
threats short of duress, Walker v. American Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 948 
P.2d 1123 (1997), or by great imbalance on the parties bargaining power with the 
stronger party's terms being non-negotiable and the weaker party being 
prevented by market factors timing, or other pressures from being able to 
contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from 
contracting at all. 
Id There were no "high pressure tactics" in place here. Negotiations took place over several 
months and the Harrises either did or could have consulted with an attorney. Nor was there any 
coercion, as there was an unresolved legal dispute which the parties chose to settle through the 
mineral lease. 
Second, 
Lack of knowledge can be shown by the lack of understanding regarding 
the contract terms arising from the use of inconspicuous print, ambiguous 
wording, or complex legalistic language, the lack of opportunity to study the 
contract and inquire about its terms, or disparity in the sophistication, knowledge, 
or experience of the parties. 
Id Section 27 is not and has never been alleged to be ambiguous, inconspicuous, or in technical 
legalese. The lease was only four (4) pages long and Section 27 was in the same size font as 
every other term. Furthermore, the heading "Title" was in all capital letters. (R. Vol. I, pp. 107- 
09.) After the holding in Treasure Valley Concrete and the district court quieting title to the sand 
and gravel in their name, the Harrises simply do not like it and now cry foul in order to establish 
a takings claim. 
Last, 
When determining whether a contractual provision is [substantively] 
unconscionable, the court must consider the purpose and effect of the terms at 
issue, the needs of both parties and the commercial setting in which the 
agreement was executed, and the reasonableness of the terms at the time of 
contracting. 
139 Idaho at 39, 72 P.3d at 883. The purpose of Section 27 was to resolve and provide each 
party with certain assurances concerning the title to the subject sand and gravel. At the time of 
contracting, the State needed assurance that it would not be sued for damages due to the 
uncertainty as to the definition of "mineral" in Idaho Code § 47-701 and the effect of the 
reservation in the deed. The Harrises desired to continue mining and agreed to pay the small 
royalty and administrative fee collected on the vast majority of State mineral leases. 
The Harrises also contend that the mineral lease was a "contract of adhesion" and seek to 
rely on a case from the California Court of Appeals. Appellants' Brief at 38-39. This Court has 
stated "an adhesion contract cannot be held procedurally unconscionable solely because there 
was no bargaining over the terms. Adhesion contracts are a fact of modern life. They are not 
against public policy." Lovey, 139 Idaho at 42, 72 P.3d at 883. Moreover, the Harrises provide 
no evidence that the State would not have agreed to adjust or remove terms in the lease. 
Finally, even if this Court were to accept the Harrises' assertion that a party may not 
waive its constitutional rights, as discussed in Section I of this Response, those rights would only 
have existed during the pre-lease period (before 1986). Consequently, the four-year statute of 
limitations in Idaho Code 5 5-224 bars their recovery. 
C. Even if This Court Holds the Entire Lease or Section 27 Unenforceable, the Statute 
of Limitations Contained in Idaho Code 5 5-224 Bars the Harrises' Recovery 
The statute of limitations period for inverse condemnation claims is contained in Idaho 
Code 5 5-224 which is the statute of limitations for all actions not specifically provided for in 
another statute. Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 11 1 Idaho 878, 880, 728 P.2d 767, 769 
(1986). Idaho Code 5 5-224 requires that claims within its purview must be commenced within 
four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued. 
While the State does not agree that a "taking" occurred in the case at hand, due to the 
provisions of Section 27 of the mineral lease, if such a "taking" did occur "the time of the taking 
occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiffs 
loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent." Intermountain West, 11 1 Idaho at 
880, 728 P.2.d at 769. The statute of limitations began to run for the Harrises' claims on or 
about May 19, 1986, when they executed the mineral lease. 
The Harrises contend that the statute did not begin to run until the State renounced its 
claim of ownership of the sand and gravel and terminated the mineral lease in November 1999. 
The Harrises seek to rely on C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 
P.3d 194 (2003), for the proposition that their cause of action did not accrue until all of their 
damages were fixed to a precise dollar amount. Appellants' Brief at 41-43. The Court in C&G 
created a narrow exception to the statute of limitations contained in Idaho Code 5 5-224, which 
specifically applies only to construction projects, known as the "project completion" rule. 
In C&G the highway district believed that it had a fifty (50) foot easement through 
C&G's property by virtue of a 1921 resolution. 139 Idaho at 141, 75 P.3d at 194. Plaintiffs 
objected and, beginning in January 1992, the highway was constructed through their property. 
Id. Construction was completed in November 1992 and opened to the public in May 1993. 
139 Idaho at 142, 75 P.3d at 195. In January 1997 it was discovered that the highway district did 
not in fact have an easement across C&G's property. Id. C&G immediately filed suit for inverse 
condemnation. Id. 
This Court created a narrow exception lo the statute of limitations contained in Idaho 
Code 5 5-224 and allowed C&G's suit to go forward. The Court reasoned that since C&G would 
have been unable to ascertain the exact physical location of project until its completion, it would 
have been impractical for C&G to undertake "piecemeal litigation" to collect its damages as the 
project progressed. 139 Idaho at 144, 75 P.3d at 198. Therefore, since C&G filed suit within 
four (4) years of the date the road was opened to the public, the suit was timely filed under Idaho 
Code 5 5-224. Id. 
This Court went to great lengths to state that this exception was only to apply to 
construction projects and not to cases where there was no direct physical taking. 139 Idaho at 
144-44, 75 P.3d at 197-98. Specifically, the Court stated that the exception should not be taken 
as a reversal of McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners, 128 Idaho 213, 912 P.2d 100 
(1996), or to disrupt the rule articulated in Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 
1001 (1979), which applies to "claims of inverse condemnation not involving a construction 
project." Id,. Therefore, since the Harrises' claims do not involve a construction project, or even 
a direct physical taking, McCuskey is controlling. 
In McCuskey the plaintiff was issued a "stop-work order" on November 13, 1986, in the 
middle of his construction project, due to a perceived zoning violation. 128 Idaho at 215, 912 
P.2d at 102. The plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment as to the validity of the zoning 
ordinance on December 1 1, 1986. On March 29, 1993 the Supreme Court ruled on the petition 
that the zoning ordinance was invalid. Id. Based upon this ruling, the plaintiff filed an inverse 
condemnation action on February 16, 1994. The Court in McCuskey held that the plaintiffs 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations contained in Idaho Code $ 5-224 which began to 
run on the date of the "stop-work order" and not the date the declaratory judgment was rendered. 
128 Idahoat217,912P.2dat 104 
The course of events in McCuskey is nearly identical to that of the case at hand. The 
Harrises were informed of the State's claim to the sand and gravel on their property, in their 
deed, in 1985, and the lease they executed on May 19, 1986, fully apprised them of the 
"restrictions" the State was imposing. The 1996 lease contained the same terms as the 1986 
lease. Therefore, at the very latest, the signing of the 1986 lease was the time that "the full 
extent of the Plaintiffs' loss of use and enjoyment of the property [became] apparent." 
Intermountain West, 11 1 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769. It was not until the Treasure Valley 
Concrete decision in 1999 and the State's subsequent revocation of the mineral lease that the 
Harrises commenced this suit in 2002, sixteen (16) years after their claim arose. 
The outcome of Treasure Valley Concrete is proof positive that the Harrises would not 
have needed to engage in the "piecemeal litigation" which the holding of C&G sought to avoid. 
The Harrises would simply have had to file a single lawsuit within four (4) years of the State's 
first assertion of ownership of the sand and gravel on their land. Since the Harrises did not file 
their claim within the four (4) years following the signing of the mineral lease, their claim for 
inverse condemnation is barred by Idaho Code $ 5-224. 
The Harrises' attempt to liken the State's actions to that of a "continuing tort" is contrary 
to Supreme Court's holding in McCuskey and Intermountain West. The Court in McCuskey 
directly addressed the "continuing tort" argument the Harrises are attempting to make: 
He likens his claim against Canyon County to that of a continuing tort in 
that the County's downsizing, issuance of a stop-work order and rescission of his 
building permit are in the nature of ongoing acts that served to continuously 
constrain him from using his property as he wished until the downsizing was 
adjudicated as void. See Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398,401, 630 P.2d 685,688 
(1981). McCuskey's attempt to analogize the accrual of his inverse 
condemnation cause of action to that of a continuing tortjlies directly in the face 
however of our decision in Intermountain West. 
128 Idaho at 217, 912 P.2d at 104 (emphasis added). 
The Harrises contend that the statute of limitations should begin to run from November 
1999 since that is the date they 
were, for the first time, able to calculate with some reliability the type and extent 
of the damages suffered. The full amount of rents and royalties, interest and 
penalties and adjustments were known. The full extent of the State's interference 
with the Harrises' surface estate rights could be identified and valued. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Three - Inverse Condemnation and 
Memorandum in Support Thereof at 33-34 (R. Vol. V, pp. 909-10). Their theory was expressly 
rejected by this Court in McCuskey: 
Moreover, it is well settled that uncertainty as to the amount of damages cannot 
bar recovery so long as the underlying cause of action is determined. Besides, 
although McCuskey may not have known the full extent of his damages at the 
time the stop-work order was issued, he would have known with certainty what 
they were once a taking had been finally adjudicated. 
128 Idaho at 21 8,912 P.2d at 105, quoting Bartlett v. Peak, 107 Idaho 284, 285, 688 P.2d 1189, 
1190 (1984). Therefore, the Harrises' argument that the statute of limitations should not have 
started to run until their alleged damages could be precisely calculated down to the last cent is 
without merit. To hold otherwise could potentially provide a windfall in interest, at the State's 
expense, to other plaintiffs who operated under state mineral leases that were executed at dates 
much earlier than the Harrises'. 
Idaho Code 5 5-224 and this Court's interpretation of it required the Harrises to file their 
claims by May 19, 1990. The Harrises did not file their claims until November 2002, twelve 
(12) years after the statute had mn out. Therefore, the Harrises' claim for inverse condemnation 
was not filed in a timely manner and judgment to the State should be affirmed. 
D. The District Court Properly Held That the Harrises Are Not Entitled to Damages 
The Harrises argue that the district court erred when it ruled that they were not entitled to 
damages. Appellants' Brief at 44-50. In making this argument, the Harrises cite various Idaho 
statutes and case law in an effort to show that damages are available in a quiet title suit. They do 
not provide any support for the question here, however: Why the district court erred in 
concluding that damages are not available in this case? The answer lies, as is generally the 
situation, not in an elaborate analysis of Idaho and non-Idaho law but in the record before the 
district court. Here, whether the claim viewed as lying in quiet title, or ejection and ouster, it 
fails as a matter of law. 
The record below shows that the Harrises' rights emanate from writings - deeds and 
leases. Those writing show, and the district court held, that the Harrises authorized the State's 
actions under section 27 of the lease agreement: 
"[Pllaintiffs assumed responsibility for satisfying themselves regarding 
ownership of land and agreed to waive any claim for refimd of the rents and 
royalties paid to defendants in the event defendants did not actually have title to 
the sand and gravel." (R. Vol. IV, P. 740.) 
e "Because the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the State in which they 
specifically acknowledged the nature of the State's title[,] . . . they cannot 
establish that the State wrongfully dispossessed them of the sand and gravel" as a 
predicate for an award of mesne profits. (R. Vol. IV, p. 741 .) 
Thus, even if one assumes that Idaho law allows damages under any or all of the Harrises' 
claims, a necessary predicate of wrongful occupation or possession by the State must be shown. 
The Harrises failed to make that showing, since IDL's actions were specifically authorized, and 
thus protected from damages claims of the sort which they raised below, by the lease terms. 
Thus, rather than the "occupation" of the sand and gravel estate being wrongful, the Harrises 
expressly consented to it. 
E. The District Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney's Fees 
The Harrises claim the district court improperly denied their request for attorney's fees 
under Idaho Code 5 12-117. However, the Harrises failed to move for such fees under Idaho 
Code Ej 12-1 1 7 ~ ;  their request to the court was that, "Plaintiffs should be awarded its costs and 
fees incurred in defending against Defendants' counterclaim seeking to quiet title in Plaintiffs' 
property because it was brought frivolously pursuant to Idaho Code Ej 12-121 and other 
applicable Idaho law." Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Fees dated August 8, 2007. As 
shown below, the State acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law, and no claims or defenses 
were unreasonably premised or frivolously undertaken. 
The Harrises allege that their "claim of ownership had already been decided in Treasure 
Valley Concrete" (Appellants' Brief at 52), and that this proves the State was "unreasonable" 
As stated previously, pp. 13, 18 herein, appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time 
on appeal. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Chu~ch v. Paz, 144 Idaho at 310, 160 P.3d at 749. Additionally, 
parties will be held not only to the issues presented to the trial court, hut also the theories upon which 
those issues were presented. Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197, 668 P.2d 73 (1983). Here, while the 
Harrises did mention Idaho Code fi 12-117 in a 2004 Memorandum (R. Vol. IV, pp. 757-58) and with 
respect to a previous attorney fee request, Plaintiffs' 2007 Memorandum of Costs and Fees was premised 
on Idaho Code $ 12-121. Accordingly, an appeal based on the contention that the district court should 
have granted fees under $ 12-1 17 is not cognizable. 
thus entitling Plaintiffs to fees under Idaho Code $ 12-121. However, Treasure Valley Concrete 
was not dispositive of the quiet title question in the present case. Unlike Treasure Valley 
Concrete, the State did not rely upon the term "mineral" to include sand and gravel. Rather, this 
case involved a 1971 State deed which had specifically reserved minerals by the words 
"including sand and gravel" in the deed. Further, and contrary to Treasure Valley Concrete, the 
State's position was that the Land Board had the authority to reserve sand and gravel in the deed 
regardless of the definition of "mineral" because of the Board's authority. These two key 
differences from Treasure Valley Concrete mean that the State's position had merit. 
Also central to the question of whether the State's position in this case was reasonable 
were the lower court's observations. 
I'm reversing my earlier pronouncement. I'm granting summary 
judgment to the Harrises. I do that with some reluctance. The deed clearly says 
including sand and gravel, but my interpretation of the deed is that the Land 
Board was attempting to include sand and gravel within minerals under 47-701. 
The Treasure Valley case, I think clearly tells me that minerals at the time 
the deed was drafted did not include sand and gravel and, therefore, on the issue 
of quieting title, I'm quieting title in favor of the Harrises. I say I do it 
reluctantly because ihe deed clearly says including sand and gravel, but the fact 
that the drafter of the deed used a coma [sic] as opposed to a semicolon and 
attempted to rely on the mineral grant afforded the Land Board in 47-701 to 
include sand and gravel, I think, was clearly outside the statutory authority of the 
Land Board. And, therefore, I'm granting summary judgment on behalf of the 
Harrises with respect to the quiet title action. 
Tr. p. 44,ls. 22-25; p. 45,ls. 1-15. 
As shown by the lower court's comments, the State did not present a frivolous or 
unreasonable position in this suit, i.e., a deed reserving sand and gravel was different than the 
Treasure Valley Concrete case. Importantly, the court decided that the State initially was correct 
since this case was "different fiom Treasure Valley Concrete because of the express 
reservation." 
The district court's view of the merit of the State's position is based on logic and this 
also shows the merit of the suit. The State's legal theory is simple; the Land Board in 1971 may 
have thought that "sand and gravel" were included as "minerals" in the general mineral 
reservation in Idaho Code C) 47-701. But rather than simply rely on the term "minerals," the 
Board consciously chose to add commodities to the language of the deed to make sure the 
purchaser understood that those commodities were reserved. If there was an ambiguity as to 
whether "minerals" included "sand and gravel," it was cleared up by the Board in that the face of 
the deed stated that "minerals" included sand and gravel. Legally, in 1999, it turned out that 
"minerals" do not include "sand and gravel," based on the Treasure Valley Concrete case. It 
does not matter, however, that the Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that "minerals" does not include 
sand and gravel because the Board did not rely upon the term "minerals" in the deed, but 
specifically identified sand and gravel in the reservation. 
The Harrises lost on two of their three claims; the mesne profit claim and the inverse 
condemnation claim. In accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B), the lower 
court considered "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties." Under this rule, it is Appellees who are the prevailing parties, not 
Appellants. Thus, the Harrises are not in a position to be awarded attorney's fees under Idaho 
Code C) 12-121 because they were not the prevailing party. 
Further, and in accordance with Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional 
Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1991), any finding with respect to 
frivolity or unreasonableness depends on reviewing the entire course of the litigation. 119 Idaho 
at 563, 808 P.2d at 1309. Under the Magic Valley standard, since the State prevailed as a matter 
of law with respect to two of the three issues raised by the Harrises, the State's actions were not 
frivolous or unreasonable as a matter of law with respect to the "entire course of litigation." 
The Harrises also requested this Court award attorney's fees pursuant to the private 
attorney general doctrine as expressed in Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 
(1984). However, there are two reasons why the Harrises are not allowed fees under Hellar. 
First, the "Private Attorney General Doctrine" was designed to create an incentive for private 
litigants to enforce public rights. Here, the Harrises are only seeking to privately benefit as they 
are the only persons who did not resolve their claims with the State. There are no public rights at 
issue here. 106 Idaho at 577-78, 682 P.2d 530-31. As the only persons standing to benefit from 
the suit, this is not a case wherein there are a "large number" of individuals standing to benefit 
from the decision as required by Hellar. Id. Accordingly, the Harrises were not in a position to 
be awarded fees under Hellar and the lower court properly so ruled. 
XI .  
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that the rulings of the district court be affirmed in all respects. 
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